United States District Court,

S.D. Texas,

Houston Division.

UNITED VAN LINES, LLC, Plaintiff,

v.

Steven MARKS and Joanmarie Marks, Defendants.

Dec. 7, 2005.

.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ELLISON, District J.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff United Van Lines, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket # 63). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from alleged loss and damage to household goods owned by Defendants Steven and Joanmarie Marks (“Marks”), and transported by Plaintiff United Van Lines, LLC (“United”). In August 2002, the Marks hired Third Party Defendant Import-Export International, Inc. (“IEI”) to pack and move their personal goods from their home in Mexico to San Diego, California, and to store the goods for their ultimate transport to Texas.] Richard Mikhail (“Mikhail”) of IEI served as the Marks’ agent in arranging and overseeing their move. Through Mikhail, the Marks selected United to serve as the interstate carrier that would transport their goods from California to Texas.

IEI employees packed and transported the first shipment of the Marks’ goods across the Mexican/American border to IEI’s San Diego warehouse in late August and early September 2002. In April 2003, Mikhail contracted with Sullivan Moving & Storage Company (“Sullivan”) for Sullivan to pick up the first shipment of goods from IEI’s warehouse and deliver them to Sullivan’s warehouse. On April 22, 2003, Sullivan picked up and inspected the first shipment of goods, which were identified by number with green “United” tags. Sullivan’s inventory forms bore the name “Sullivan United” and included Sullivan’s “United” agency number. Sullivan’s inventory noted that there was crush damage to several boxes, and that several boxes had previously been opened. Sullivan’s inspection did not note any water damage or damage to the contents of the boxes, except for a damaged “Direct T.V.” dish. Williams Decl. ¶ 4.

Because IEI did not have a sufficient number of workers to complete the packing, Mikhail arranged with Sullivan to hire Preferred Moving, the independent contractors that are used by Sullivan, to pack the Marks’ remaining goods. In May 2003, Preferred Moving employees packed the second shipment of goods, labeling the boxes with orange “United” tags and using boxes and inventory sheets with the “United” logo. The Preferred Moving packers also wore uniforms with a “Sullivan/United” logo. IEI transported this second shipment of goods across the border from Mexico to IEI’s warehouse in San Diego. Of the two shipments of boxes that were crossed over the border, Customs tagged twenty to thirty of the boxes as having been opened, inspected, and re-taped by customs officials. Shelton Aff. ¶ 5.

On May 30, 2003, the Marks’ goods were tendered to United for their interstate shipment from California to Texas. United issued a bill of lading naming Steven Marks as the shipper, Sullivan as the booking and originating agent, and Suddath Relocation Systems, Inc. (“Suddath”) as the destination agent. United’s driver picked up the first shipment of goods at Sullivan’s warehouse, and after a visual inspection, he determined that the boxes were crushed and in “sad shape.” Edwards Dep. at 34, July 1, 2005. He did not note any missing boxes or sign the household goods inventory. Id. at 41. On the same day, United’s driver picked up the second shipment of goods at IEI’s warehouse and made no notes about the condition of the boxes or of any missing boxes. The driver then transported both shipments of the Marks’ goods from California to Texas. On June 7, 2003, United’s driver delivered the goods to the Suddath warehouse in Houston, Texas, where he saw that the boxes were in the same condition as when he had picked them up, except for “some settling.” Edwards Dep. at 57. The goods remained in storage-in-transit at Suddath’s warehouse from June 7 through July 7, 2003, when Suddath delivered the goods to the Marks’ home in Spring, Texas. When their goods were delivered, the Marks noticed that many of the boxes of their goods were damaged or missing. In July through September 2003, the Marks notified Sullivan and United of the damage and demanded compensation for the damage and loss of their goods.

United subsequently filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment concerning the rights and liabilities of United and the Marks. United contends that it has no liability for loss or damage to the Marks’ goods because the Marks cannot prove that their goods were delivered to United in good condition, and because the goods were improperly packed before tender to United. United also asserts that while Sullivan acted as United’s disclosed household goods agent in booking the interstate shipment of the Marks’ goods from California to Texas, Sullivan acted under its own authority and in its own capacity when it picked up the Marks’ goods from the IEI warehouse and moved the goods into storage at Sullivan’s warehouse. Finally, United argues that the Marks’ third through sixth sets of claim forms fail to provide a specific, determinable amount for each item claimed, and are therefore barred as a matter of law.

Conversely, the Marks argue that Sullivan acted as United’s agent at all times in its dealings with them, and that they have shown that their goods were in good condition when delivered to Sullivan and United. The Marks also contend that they provided United with proper and complete claim forms for a specific and determinable amount. The Court held a hearing on United’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Because the Court concludes that the Marks have not produced evidence to support their claims against United, it need not determine the adequacy of the Marks’ claim forms.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

A motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires the Court to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, based on the evidence thus far presented. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir.2001) (quotations omitted). A genuine issue of material facts exists if a reasonable jury could enter a verdict for the non-moving party. Crawford v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 234 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir.2000). The Court views all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Id.

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial” and “mandates the entry of summary judgment” for the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If United shows that there is a lack of evidence to support the Marks’ claims against it, the Marks “must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Kee, 247 F.3d at 210 (quotation omitted). The Marks cannot satisfy this burden with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (per curiam).

B. Defendants’ Carmack Amendment Claim

Because United’s shipment of the Marks’ goods from California to Texas was an interstate shipment, United’s alleged liability for damage to the shipment is determined by federal law. Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 778 (5th Cir.2003); Missouri Pac. RR. v. H. Rouw Co., 258 F.2d 445, 446 (5th Cir.1958). Specifically, the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, provides “the exclusive cause of action for loss or damages to goods arising from the interstate transportation of those goods by a common carrier.” Hoskins, 343 F.3d at 778. The Marks do not contest that their claims against United arise under the Carmack Amendment. See Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, 12.

A shipper seeking damages from a carrier for injury to a shipment makes out a prima facie case under the Carmack Amendment by showing (1) that the goods were delivered to the carrier in good condition; (2) that the goods were delivered by the carrier back to the shipper in damaged condition, or not at all; and (3) the amount of damages. Missouri Rac. RR. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 138, 84 S.Ct. 1142, 12 L.Ed.2d 194 (1964); Hoskins, 343 F.3d at 778. Here, United argues that the Marks’ evidence does not and cannot establish that their goods were delivered to United in good condition, and that therefore, the Marks cannot establish a prima facie claim against United.

The bill of lading produced by United for the interstate shipment of Defendants’ goods states that the shipment “was received in apparent good condition.” Defs.’ Ex. 17. The Fifth Circuit has found that such a bill of lading is prima facie evidence of tender in good condition for only those portions of a shipment which are visible and open to inspection. Accura Sys. Inc. v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 98 F.3d 874, 878 (5th Cir.1996); Spartus Corp. v. S/S Yafo, 590 F.2d 1310, 1319 (5th Cir.1979). When goods are not visible or open for inspection upon tender, the bill of lading is not sufficient proof of delivery in good condition. In such case, the shipper must present other “adequate proof” of delivery in good condition, or proof “by a preponderance of the evidence.” Accura Sys. Inc., 98 F.3d at 878 (citing Frosty Land Foods Int’l, Inc. v. Refrigerated Transp. Co., 613 F.2d 1344, 1347 (5th Cir.1980); Spartus Corp., 590 F.2d at 1319). Circumstantial evidence that is substantial and reliable may be used to show delivery in good condition. Accura Sys. Inc., 98 F.3d at 878 (citation omitted). In the instant case, the majority of the Marks’ goods were in sealed boxes that were not visible or open to inspection by United. Therefore, the Marks must produce other substantial and reliable proof that their boxes were tendered to United in good condition.

1. Tender of Goods to United

Steven Marks has testified that he was present during IEI’s packing of the first shipment of goods and witnessed no damage to the goods. Steven Marks Dep. at 27, Sept. 27, 2004. Mr. Marks later saw the first shipment at the IEI warehouse in San Diego, and the boxes were in the same condition as the day the cartons were moved from the Marks’ home in Mexico. Id. Mr. Marks was present during the packing of the second shipment of goods, as well, and has testified that there was no damage to the goods when they left the Marks’ home to be delivered to the IEI warehouse. Id. at 32, 34-35. The Marks have also obtained testimony from Christine Russell, a Preferred Moving packer who assisted in the packing of the second shipment. Ms. Russell testified that the goods were properly packed, and that none of the goods was broken. Russell Dep. at 15, 21, Aug. 16, 2005. Additionally, the Marks point to Mikhail’s testimony that when Sullivan picked up the first shipment of goods from IEI’s warehouse in San Diego, only ten boxes had been damaged, the majority of which contained linens and books that had sustained no damage. Mikhail Dep. at 29-33, Oct. 19, 2004. Finally, the Marks point out that United’s driver failed to record any missing cartons from either the first or second shipment and did not note damage to either shipment beyond what was already written on the descriptive inventories.

This evidence is not sufficient to prove tender of the Marks’ goods to United in good condition. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the goods changed hands many times, and the Marks have not presented any evidence that their goods remained in good condition until the time they were tendered to United. The Marks’ first and second shipments of goods were packed by IEI and Preferred Movers, respectively, at which time the goods left the Marks’ custody and control. IEI then took both shipments across the Mexican/American border and through Customs, which opened, examined, and re-taped several of the boxes. Thereafter, IEI stored both shipments of the Marks’ goods in its San Diego warehouse for a period of time, and Sullivan also picked up and stored the first shipment in its warehouse. Sullivan noted that boxes in the first shipment had been crushed and opened. This all occurred prior to the tender of the goods to United for shipment to Texas. At the time the goods were tendered to United, United’s driver also saw that boxes of the Marks’ goods had been crushed.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Marks, the Court assumes that the first shipment of boxes was in good condition when Mr. Marks saw it in IEI’s warehouse, as he testified. This does not prove, however, that the boxes were still in good condition when Sullivan picked them up from IEI’s warehouse, or that they were in good condition when United’s driver picked them up from Sullivan. Similarly, Mikhail’s testimony that only ten boxes were damaged when Sullivan picked up the first shipment does not prove that the shipment was otherwise in good condition when it was later tendered to United. The Court will also assume from Ms. Russell’s testimony that the Preferred Moving packers properly packed the second shipment of boxes. This also does not prove, however, that these boxes were in good condition when they reached IEI’s warehouse, or that they were in good condition when United’s driver picked them up from IEI. United’s driver testified that United did not require him to note missing or damaged cartons when he picked the shipments. Edwards Dep. at 41. His failure to record missing boxes or damage to the boxes beyond what had already been noted does not prove that the goods were tendered to United in good condition. Moreover, the Marks have conceded that they do not know when their goods were damaged or lost or who caused the damage or loss to their goods. Steven Marks Dep. at 124-125; Joanmarie Marks Dep. at 47, Sept. 27, 2004. The Marks have not shown by adequate proof or by a preponderance of the evidence that their goods were tendered to United in good condition, or that the goods that have been lost were ever tendered to United.

2. Sullivan as United’s Agent

Additionally, the Marks contend that Sullivan acted as United’s agent at all times in its dealings with them, and that United is therefore liable for any damage Sullivan caused to the Marks’ goods. The Marks thereby seek to hold United liable for damage caused prior the tender of their goods to United, which might include damage caused when Sullivan picked up and stored the first shipment of the Marks’ goods in its warehouse. Conversely, United argues that Sullivan played two separate and unrelated roles in the process of the Marks’ move: first, when it picked up and stored the first shipment of the Marks’ goods, which was done under its individual, intrastate authority, and second, when it acted as United’s disclosed household goods agent in booking the interstate shipment of the Marks’ goods from California to Texas. Both parties filed supplemental responses with the Court on the issue of agency.

In order to show that Sullivan acted with apparent authority as United’s agent, the Marks must demonstrate that United either affirmatively held Sullivan out as having authority to act on its behalf, knowingly permitted Sullivan to hold itself out as having this authority, or acted with such a lack of ordinary care as to clothe Sullivan with the indicia of authority. The Fifth Circuit has emphasized that “[i]t is the manifestations of the alleged principal and agent as between themselves that is decisive and not the appearances to a third party or what that third party should have known.” Esso Int’l, Inc. v. SS Captain John, 443 F.2d 1114, 1148 (5th Cir.1971). An agency relationship may be shown through the agent’s course of conduct, but only to the extent that the principal knew of and consented to the conduct. Id.; Crowe v. Hertz Corp., 382 F.2d 681, 688 (5th Cir.1967).

In their response to United’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Marks point to evidence showing that when Sullivan picked up the first shipment of goods from IEI’s warehouse, Sullivan used inventory forms bearing the name “Sullivan United” and United’s logo. These inventory forms also identified Sullivan’s “United” agency number. Likewise, the Marks have demonstrated that the Preferred Moving packers, who Mikhail contacted through Sullivan, used packing materials, forms, and labels identified with the “United” logo and wore uniforms with a “Sullivan/United” logo. A Sullivan representative testified that Sullivan includes the “United” logo on its forms for marketing purposes, to let people know that Sullivan is an agent of United. Keiper Dep. at 68, July 20, 2005.

While the Court agrees that Sullivan’s use of United’s logo might make it difficult for a consumer to distinguish when Sullivan is and is not acting as United’s agent, consumer confusion is not sufficient to prove apparent agency. Rather, the Marks must show that United knew of and permitted Sullivan to hold itself out as United’s agent. Evidence of Sullivan’s conduct and use of United’s logo alone does not demonstrate United’s knowledge of or acquiescence in this conduct.

In their supplemental response, the Marks point to United’s admission that federal regulations require all of Sullivan’s documents to bear United’s name, regardless of whether they are interstate or intrastate documents. See 49 C.F.R. § 375.207. The Marks argue that this admission indicates that United knowingly held Sullivan out as its agent. The Court disagrees. United’s knowledge of federal regulations requiring Sullivan to include its name on all of its documents is not sufficient to demonstrate apparent agency. First, United’s admission does not demonstrate its knowledge that Sullivan used United’s name on anything except the documents. It does not demonstrate that United was aware of Sullivan’s use of boxes, labels, or uniforms with the “United” logo. Furthermore, Sullivan’s compliance with the federal regulation requiring its use of United’s name is not, by itself, a representation that Sullivan acted as United’s agent in all of its activities. Thus, United’s knowledge of Sullivan’s compliance with the regulation does not equate to knowledge of, or acquiescence in, any representation that Sullivan acted at all times as United’s agent.

The remainder of the Marks’ supplemental response points to evidence that Mikhail understood Sullivan to be acting as United’s agent throughout the entire move, that Sullivan and United required a release from the Marks for Sullivan to take the goods out of its local authority, and that a Sullivan representative asked United to permit Sullivan to review any settlement that United entered into with IEI before releasing information to the Marks. None of this evidence demonstrates that United knew or should have known that Sullivan represented to the Marks that it was acting as United’s agent as to any service other than its booking of the interstate shipment of the Marks’ goods.

The Marks have not produced evidence showing that their goods were tendered to United in good condition. Because the Marks cannot prove this element of their prima facie case under the Carmack Amendment, United is entitled to summary judgment against the Marks.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and JUDGMENT IS ENTERED for Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FINAL JUDGMENT

Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a), and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum and Order, the Court finds that Plaintiff has no liability for loss or damage to Defendants’ goods. Therefore, JUDGMENT IS ENTERED for Plaintiff.

 

 

 

 

Court of Appeal of Louisiana,

First Circuit.

Steven C. TAYLOR

v.

J. Jesus ARELLANO, Transcor America, L.L.C., General Accident Insurance

Company, Glenn E. Evans, Transport America, and Great West Casualty Company.

Dec. 22, 2005.

On Appeal from the 22nd Judicial District Court Parish of St. Tammany, Louisiana Docket No. 2003-10363, Division “F”. Honorable Martin E. Coady, Judge Presiding.

ANALYSIS

This case arises out of a two-vehicle accident that occurred in Michigan. Taylor, a Louisiana resident, was being transported with other prisoners in a cargo van owned by Transcor America and driven by its employee, Glenn Evans, when Evans lost control of the van and collided with an eighteen-wheeler owned by TCA and driven by its employee, Arellano, injuring Taylor. After being named as defendants in Taylor’s lawsuit, TCA and Arellano objected to the Louisiana court’s personal jurisdiction over them. An affidavit in support of their exception averred that Arellano was and continued to be a Texas resident and had no connection whatsoever with the state of Louisiana. TCA, a Minnesota corporation with its principal place of business in Minnesota, alleged it had no place of business in Louisiana and did not regularly conduct any business here. It had only occasional random contact with Louisiana if one of its drivers happened to pass through the state or, even less frequently, made a delivery in Louisiana. However, neither the TCA vehicle, driver, or shipment when this accident occurred had any connection with Louisiana.

. TCA’s insurer, Great West Casualty Company, was also named as a defendant.

Taylor offered no arguments or evidence to show how the Louisiana court might have acquired personal jurisdiction over Arellano. Therefore, the dismissal of the claim against him is affirmed without further comment from this court.

As to TCA, Taylor opposed the exception, arguing that a federal statute required TCA to appoint an agent for service of process in each state in which it operated, and that the statute thereby provided for personal jurisdiction over motor carriers in states through which they might only traverse occasionally in the course of their business. The federal statute upon which he relies is 49 U.S.C .A. § 13304, which states, in pertinent part:

(a) Designation of agent–A motor carrier or broker providing transportation subject to jurisdiction under chapter 135, … shall designate an agent in each State in which it operates by name and post office address on whom process issued by a court with subject matter jurisdiction may be served in an action brought against that carrier or broker. The designation shall be in writing and filed with the Department of Transportation and each State in which the carrier operates may require that an additional designation be filed with it. If a designation under this subsection is not made, service may be made on any agent of the carrier or broker within that State.

This statute is often referred to as the “Motor Carrier Act.”

Taylor claims TCA was required to designate an agent for service of process in Louisiana, that there was a designated agent, and that service was made on that agent, thereby acquiring jurisdiction over the person of TCA. In the alternative, in the event TCA did not have an agent and service was made on an incorrect agent, Taylor contends TCA cannot, by failing to comply with the statute, avoid the assertion of personal jurisdiction by the courts of this state. Although he contended the Motor Carrier Act obviated the need to determine whether TCA had “minimum contacts” with the state, Taylor also claimed that the affidavit submitted by TCA showed that its contacts with the state sufficed to bring it within the personal jurisdiction of the Louisiana court.

Replying to Taylor’s opposition, TCA submitted documents from the Louisiana Secretary of State, which were referenced in its answers to interrogatories and which showed TCA had not applied for authority to do business in Louisiana and had not appointed an agent for service of process in Louisiana. TCA denied Taylor’s claim that any such agent existed or had been served, and contended, in any event, that such designation or service would not operate as a consent to suit in Louisiana for causes of action arising elsewhere.

Under the express wording of the present Louisiana long-arm statute, LSA-R.S. 13:3201, et seq., the sole inquiry into jurisdiction over a nonresident is an analysis of the constitutional due process requirements. If the assertion of jurisdiction meets the constitutional requirements of due process, the assertion of jurisdiction is authorized under the long-arm statute. The limits of the Louisiana long-arm statute and the limits of constitutional due process are coextensive. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 513 So.2d 1188, 1192 (La.1987); A & L Energy, Inc. v. Pegasus Group, 00-3255 (La.6/29/01), 791 So.2d 1266, 1270. A two-part test is to be applied in determining whether in personam jurisdiction would violate due process: (1) there must be a “minimum contact” from an affirmative act of the defendant, and (2) it must be fair and reasonable to require the defendant to come into the state to defend the action. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Ballard, 517 So.2d 233, 235-36 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987). The minimum contacts prong of the due process analysis may be satisfied if the contacts give rise to specific personal jurisdiction or to general personal jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction over a defendant occurs when the plaintiff’s claim arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n. 8, 104 S .Ct. 1868, 1872 n. 8, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). In the absence of conduct giving rise to specific jurisdiction, general jurisdiction will exist when the defendant has engaged in “systematic and continuous” activities in the forum state. Id. at n. 9. While the distinction between “general” and “specific” jurisdiction provides a useful analytic device, the use of these categories does not eliminate the need to evaluate each assertion of personal jurisdiction in light of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. de Reyes v. Marine Management and Consulting, Ltd., 586 So.2d 103, 109 (La.1991).

We are aware that in a case involving the reach of the Louisiana court’s subpoena power, the supreme court stated in dicta that a principal consequence of designating an agent for service of process is to subject the foreign corporation to jurisdiction in a Louisiana court. See LSA-C.C.P. arts. 6, 1235, 5251(2); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. OKC Ltd. P’ship, 93-1629 (La.4/11/94), 634 So.2d 1186, 1187. The court noted that even if the corporation’s only “presence” is in its designating an agent for service of process, that designation facilitates its being sued in a Louisiana court and exposes it to personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1188. Despite the broad implication of these statements, we note that the issue before the court was not whether such a designation would automatically function as consent to personal jurisdiction in the state for suits arising out-of-state, when the defendant corporation did not have contacts within the state sufficient to satisfy due process. We believe the key words in this discussion by the supreme court were that the designation of an agent “facilitates” such suits and “exposes” the corporation to personal jurisdiction; the court did not address the factual circumstances under which such “exposure” would allow the exercise of such jurisdiction by the Louisiana court, because this was not the issue before it.

Moreover, in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed.485 (1952), the United States Supreme Court concluded that regardless of the presence of an agent for service of process, the court must still determine on a case-by-case basis whether the amount and kind of activities carried on by the foreign corporation in the state of the forum were sufficient to make it reasonable and just to subject the corporation to personal jurisdiction in that state. The court emphasized that the corporate activities of a foreign corporation which, under a state statute, make it necessary for it to secure a license and to designate a statutory agent upon whom process may be served provide a helpful, but not a conclusive test. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 446, 72 S.Ct. at 419. It thereby rejected the argument that the mere presence of an agent for service of process automatically satisfied the requirements of due process.

Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Taylor’s argument, based on the provisions of 49 U.S.C.A. § 13304, that this statute confers personal jurisdiction on any interstate motor carrier in any state through which its trucks might travel, however infrequently. First, as a factual matter, we note that there is no return on service in this record to establish that service was made on TCA through a registered agent or by any other means. Second, Taylor did not establish that TCA has or had a registered agent in this state, pursuant to this or any other statute. On the contrary, TCA’s answers to interrogatories and the documents referenced therein indicate that TCA does not have a registered agent for service of process in Louisiana. Third, and most importantly, even if TCA had such an agent and service was made on that agent, this fact alone would not suffice to establish personal jurisdiction. In Lyons v. Swift Transportation Co., Inc., No. 01-0209, 2001 WL 1153001 (E.D.La.9/26/01), the trucking company defendant had designated an agent for service of process, pursuant to the Motor Carrier Act, and was served through that agent. Yet the court found that under Louisiana law, a minimum contacts analysis was still applicable to the facts of the case. It determined that the plaintiff’s cause of action did not arise from any of the trucking company’s actions in the state, so there was no “specific jurisdiction.” In further reviewing the facts to determine if there was “general jurisdiction,” the court noted that the trucking company’s contacts with the state, consisting of occasional travel through Louisiana and deliveries here “from time to time” were not sufficient to subject it to the personal jurisdiction of the Louisiana court. The court stated that the plaintiff “has not shown that Swift trucks regularly travel in or through Louisiana” and “presents no record evidence establishing the volume of business Swift does in Louisiana or the frequency with which Swift’s trucks pass through Louisiana.” Lyons, 2001 WL 1153001 at p. 4. The court concluded:

Accordingly, the Court finds that designating an agent under the Motor Carrier Act, having four employees with Louisiana driver’s licenses, being involved in one accident in Louisiana in the past 30 months, passing through Louisiana and occasionally delivering goods in Louisiana, is insufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction over Swift.

The Lyons court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant trucking company, having registered an agent for service in Louisiana pursuant to the Motor Carrier Act, had thereby consented to suit in Louisiana for suits based on events occurring outside of Louisiana. Citing Fifth Circuit precedent, the court stated that appointment of an agent for service, whether pursuant to a state statute or a federal statute, did not operate as an automatic consent to suits in the state, and that the minimum contacts analysis was still required. Lyons, 2001 WL 1153001 at p. 6-7, citing Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F .2d 179, 183 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1080, 113 S.Ct. 1047, 122 L.Ed.2d 356 (1993).

Based on this jurisprudence and the facts of this case, we conclude that the courts of this state did not have personal jurisdiction over TCA, a Minnesota corporation, for the claims alleged in this lawsuit. The accident did not occur in Louisiana; the vehicle was not registered here; and the trip on which the truck was engaged had nothing to do with this state. Under these facts, Taylor’s claim did not arise out of or relate to TCA’s contacts with the state of Louisiana. Therefore, there was no “specific jurisdiction.” Moreover, the affidavit submitted by TCA in support of its exception established that its contacts with Louisiana were random and occasional, and do not meet the requirement of systematic and continuous contacts in order for “general jurisdiction” to exist. Therefore, we conclude the district court was legally correct in maintaining the exception, in finding the Louisiana court could not exert personal jurisdiction over TCA, and in dismissing Taylor’s claims against it.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. All costs of this appeal are assessed against Taylor.